A volume in Contemporary Human Resource Management: Issues, Challenges, and Opportunities Series Editor Ronald R. Sims, College of William and Mary The primary purpose of this book is to stimulate dialogue and discussion about the most effective ways of teaching ethics. Contributors to the book focus on approaches and methodologies and lessons learned that are having an impact in leading students to confront with accountability and understanding the bases of their ethical thinking, the responsibilities they have to an enlarged base (...) of stakeholders (whose needs and interests often are conflicting), and their stewardship to use their talents responsibility not only in fulfilling an enterprise's economic goals but also to recognize the impact of their actions on both individuals and larger society. The primary audiences for the book are those individuals responsible for teaching management, especially those with responsibilities for teaching business ethics. But the book is also designed for practicing managers, for these managers have among their most important responsibilities the development of people in their organizations who have the integrity, values, and competences to be effective managers of economic resources while at the same time to recognize the roles of their enterprise in shaping society. (shrink)

Most disciplines make use of thought experiments, but physics and philosophy lead the pack with heavy dependence upon them. Often this is for conceptual clarification, but occasionally they provide real theoretical advances. In spite of their importance, however, thought experirnents have received rather little attention as a topic in their own right until recently. The situation has improved in the past few years, but a mere generation ago the entire published literature on thought experiments could have been mastered in a (...) long weekend. Now the subject is beginning to flourish. Given the relative newness of the field, it might be useful to have several examples at one’s finger tips, so a number of great ones will be described. Attention will also be drawn outside physics and philosophy. In mathematics there is something analogous to thought experiments -- visual reasoning and picture proofs. I will look briefly at this class of thought experiments and try using them to make a case for possibly settling the continuum hypothesis. After this, I will return to thought experiments in the sciences and propose an account of how they work. Finally, I will end with a sketch of a topic I am currently working on, a kind of progress report which, I hope, will be an inducement to others. (shrink)

The objective of this work is to investigate Karol Wojtyła’s meta-ethics. Following the Aristotelian and Thomistic tradition, he maintains that ethics is a science. Contrary to the Aristotelian tradition, which conceives ethics as a practical science, Wojtyła sustains that ethics is also a science with theoretical objectivity. He posits the human “experience of morality,” in a specific sense, the moral experience of “I ought to do x”, as the ground for the objectivity of ethics as science. He also (...) critiques the understanding of experience as merely a sense-perception and appearance/phenomenon in empiricism and phenomenalism. However, it maintains the phenomenological understanding of experience as “lived-experience.” Thus, this work is an attempt to flesh out Karol Wojtyla's meta-ethics by investigating the following: 1. Karol Wojtyła’s Philosophy of Person as an Efficacious Moral Person. 2. Wojtyła’s Objectivity of Experience as Subjective Fact. 3. Exposition of his Understanding of Ethics. 4. Discussion of the experience of “I ought to do x”: As the Moral Ground in Karol Wojtyła’s Meta-Ethics. 5. A critical Evaluation and Conclusion. (shrink)

This essay explores the idea of experience and its epistemological and practical role in maintaining the health of a household among early modern English Royalists. A number of prominent royalists during the mid-seventeenth century British Civil Wars expended quite some effort in the collection of medical recipes, including Queen Henrietta Maria herself, as well as William and Margaret Cavendish, and the Talbot sisters—Elizabeth Grey and Alethea Howard. This essay looks at these Royalists and four of their collections: three published (...) (Henrietta Maria, Grey, Howard), and one manuscript (the Caven­dishes), in order to determine how they conceptualized experience and its role in medical practice. The claim that such recipe collections represent a new, anti-Aristotelian idea of experience as a specific, particular event is disputed through a quantitative and qualitative analysis of these collections. Instead, it is argued that there a number of related conceptions of experience found in these Royalist recipe collections, but the basic idea is one where experience indicates long experience or expertise, an idea that can traced back at least to humanist medicine of the Renaissance, and likely back to Galen. (shrink)

: The increasing attention on experiment in the last two decades has led to important insights into its material, cultural and social dimensions. However, the role of experiment as a tool for generating knowledge has been comparatively poorly studied. What questions are asked in experimental research? How are they treated and eventually resolved? And how do questions, epistemic situations, and experimental activity cohere and shape each other? In my paper, I treat these problems on the basis of detailed studies of (...) research practice. After presenting several cases from the history of electricity—Dufay, Ampère, and Faraday—I discuss a specific type of experiment—the "exploratory experiment"—and analyze how it works in concept formation. I argue that a fuller understanding of experiment can only be achieved by intertwining historical and philosophical perspectives in such a way that the very separation of the two become questioable. (shrink)

In this article, I argue that experimental ethics – like experimental economics – should also concern itself with field experiments. In particular, I defend two claims: a) that philosophers in normative ethics could considerably narrow down their disputes if they could agree on a wider range of socio-economic facts; and that b) the socio-economic facts that would be needed for this could only be generated by deliberate large-scale social experimentation. This essay normatively grounds my interest in special administration zones.

In this paper, I consider the implications of grief for philosophical theorising about absence experience. I argue that whilst some absence experiences that occur in grief might be explained by extant philosophical accounts of absence experience, others need different treatment. I propose that grieving subjects' descriptions of feeling as if the world seems empty or a part of them seems missing can be understood as referring to a distinctive type of absence experience. In these profound absence experiences, (...) I will argue, the absence of a person as a condition on various possibilities is made manifest in the structure of experience over time. Thus, by paying close attention to grief, we can see that even accounts of absence experience that are presented as in competition with one another may not be so, and that to explain all kinds of absence experience we sometimes need to appeal to something overlooked in other accounts, and which is neither straightforwardly perceptual or cognitive. I also suggest that we would have good reason to take such experiences to be part of and not merely psychological effects of grief. (shrink)

It is conventionally understood that computers play a rather limited role in theoretical mathematics. While computation is indispensable in applied mathematics and the theory of computing and algorithms is rich and thriving, one does not, even today, expect to find computers in theoretical mathematics settings beyond the theory of computing. Where computers are used, by those studying combinatorics , algebra, number theory, or dynamical systems, the computer most often assumes the role of an automated and speedy theoretician, performing manipulations and (...) checking cases in a way assumed to be possible for human theoreticians, if only they had the time, the memory, and the precision. Automated proofs have become standard tools in mathematical logic, and it is often expected that proofs be published in a computer-checkable format. It is not surprising, then, that most philosophical work on computers in theoretical mathematics has been on computers' roles as supplementary mathematicians. Donald MacKenzie's 2001 book Mechanizing Proof demonstrates the rich potential for social and historical studies to complement the substantial analytic debate in this area of philosophy. But what of computers in theoretical mathematics behaving as computers, and not as mere mechanized mathematicians? Very little role is commonly assumed for computers working as supplements to mathematicians, rather than as supplementary mathematicians themselves. Accordingly, very little philosophy has attempted to grapple with theoretical mathematics in which computers play an essential but essentially non-theoretical role. My presentation will draw on work I conducted as a researcher in harmonic analysis on fractals at Cornell University. I will analyze the explicit and implicit conceptual apparatus employed in my and my fellow researchers' use of computers in the theoretical study of second order differential equations, such as those for sound and heat flow, on various fractal analogues of the Sierpinski gasket. Such gaskets are easy to visualize in very crude approximation in a low number of dimensions. As one increases the complexity of the gasket or the refinement of one's analysis, visualization and precise computation become impossible, and soon computers are unable to produce even approximate data to model differential equations in these situations. We thus had to carefully choose analytic approaches and methods to make our theoretical mathematics amenable to computer simulation. In my case, studying the transformation of the gaskets as they are expanded into increasingly high dimensions, computer simulation eventually required that the problem be reimagined entirely in terms of interlinked systems of parameters. This computer-approximation-driven theoretical orientation shaped my mathematical intuitions toward the problem and guided my fellow researchers and me in both theoretical and computational directions. We discovered both that computer approximation could be incredibly powerful as an aid to intuition, and that it can be incredibly difficult to transfer computer-oriented mathematics back into the purely theoretical standards of our area of specialty. I will address the philosophical implications of computer-driven theoretical mathematics, asking how computer experiments can shape both the content and standards of theoretical sciences. (shrink)

Among the exciting prospects raised by advocates of predictive processing [PP] is the offer of a systematic description of our neural activity suitable for drawing explanatory bridges to the structure of conscious experience. Yet the gulf to cross seems wide. For, as critics of PP have argued, our visual experience certainly doesn’t seem probabilistic.While Clark proposes a means to make PP compatible with the experience of a determinate world, I argue that we should not rush to do (...) so. Two notions of determinacy are conflated in the claim that perception is determinate: ‘univocality’ and ‘full detail’. The former, as Clark argues, is only to be expected in any PP agent that models its world for the purpose of acting on it. But as Husserl argued, and as perceptual psychology has borne out, we significantly overestimate the degree of detail with which we perceive a univocal world.This second form of indeterminacy is due not to the probabilistic nature of PP’s model, but rather to its hierarchical structure, with increasingly coarse-grained representations as we move further from the sensory periphery. A PP system may, or may not, deliver a univocal hypothesis at each of these levels. An action-oriented PP system would only be expected to do so only at the level needed for successful action guidance. A naïve reporter’s overestimation of the degree of determinate detail in their visual experience can thereby be accounted for with a more gradual version of the ‘refrigerator light’ effect: we experience determinate details just to the degree that they’re needed – immediately as they’re needed. (shrink)

In this paper I examine the role of thought experiments in the social studies of science. More specifically, I will focus on two strands of social studies of science: the so-called sociology of scientific knowledge and the naturalistically oriented philosophy of science with interest in social dimensions of science. I begin by discussing David Hull's views on thought experiments in the study of science. His account serves as a foil that helps me to make some points about thought experiments. As (...) an illustration I discuss two example of thought experimenting in the social studies of science. The first example is the use of thought experiments by the sociologists of scientific knowledge, and the second case will be the recent work by Philip Kitcher on division of cognitive labour. With the help of these cases, I argue that Hull's negative attitude towards the use of thought experiments requires some, tempering. The notion of thought experiment will be understood broadly in this paper. One could also talk about imaginary or hypothetical examples. In social sciences the contrast for thought experiments is not an experiment, but an empirical case study. Accordingly, thought experiment in social science in an imaginary case study or a made up historical scenario. The focus of my discussion is on the various functions and argumentative roles thought experiments have or could have in social studies of science. An empirical experiment (or a case study) is not an argument by itself, nor is a thought experiment. However, they both are used in making arguments and my aim is to look how they are used. (shrink)

This project tested a two-way model of communication between lay groups and experts about genetic medicine in Perth, Western Australia. Focus group discussion with community group participants was followed by a communication workshop between community group participants and experts. Four groups of concerns or themes emerged from discussion: clinical considerations; legislative concerns; research priorities, and ethical and wider considerations. Community group concerns are not always met by the actions of "experts". This is, in part, because of the differing life-worlds of (...) each group. However, the communication workshop showed the potential of two-way communication for both lay and expert members in understanding the others' viewpoint. Further, the approach developed here offers one possible way for community groups to participate in a substantial way in policy formulation processes. (shrink)

The articles considers philosophy as an educational project. The institutionalization of philosophy is connected with the process of formation and development of the classical university as well as with the transformation of its socio-cultural status. Special attention is paid to the analysis of the essential ambivalence of philosophy and its influence to the basic priorities of philosophical education. It is emphasized that the tasks of reforming and modernizing academic philosophical programs initiate the development of variable models and technologies for teaching (...) philosophy in modern universities. It this regard, of particular interest is the Belarusian experience in reforming philosophical education in its two aspects: general philosophy course and special academic programs. The article analyzes the model of teaching philosophy at various stages and levels of higher education, which has been used at the Belarusian State University over the past 15 years. The author describes both the innovative nature of this model and its connection with the previous organization schemes and teaching priorities. Within the framework of this model, there are three levels of teaching philosophy and its various modifications. At the first level, which is focused on the preparation of bachelors, the basic course “Philosophy” is taught, which suggests an acquaintance with world classical philosophical tradition. At the second level, the course “Philosophy in the Modern World” is offered, which, taking into account the specfics of the academic preparation of graduate students, reproduces the basic ideas and concepts of modern philosophy. At the third level, in the course “Philosophy and Methodology of Science”, the main attention is paid to the issues of logic, methodology, sociology of science and education. The article considers some stages, problems and contradictions of this reform process as well as its consequences in the context of recent events in the socioeconomic and political life of Belarus. The author argues that modern converging technologies of social and humanitarian education, which are based on formal and instrumental-pragmatic criteria, have significantly influenced the processes of reforming the system of teaching the humanities and social sciences in Belarusian universities. (shrink)

The subject of this paper is the relationship between religion and sport. The aim of my considerations is to criticise the position presented by the American philosopher Eric Bain-Selbo, according to which sporting experiences may quite rightly be described as religious experiences. In the first part of the article, I reconstruct Wayne Proudfoot’s concept of religious experience that underlies Bain-Selbo’s analysis. I then discuss the research conducted by Bain-Selbo and the conclusions he draws from it. In the next part (...) of the article, referring to Charles Taylor’s hermeneutical approach, I show that Proudfoot’s and Bain-Selbo’s methodology leads to a theoretically unjustified reductionism. I argue that an in-depth articulation of individual self-interpretation allows for an insight into the dynamics of sporting and religious experiences, and thus to see the differences that separate them. In the last part of the article, I invoke the considerations of William James, John Hick and Robert Roberts and try to show that, given the moral consequences of our experiences and their phenomenological description (intentionality), the experiences evoked by sport and religion can by no means be identified with each other. (shrink)

If an alleged experience of God can constitute evidence for God’s existence, then it must be possible for God to be a perceptual particular, that is, a substantive, enduring object of perception. Furthermore, if several such experiences are to be cumulative evidence for God’s existence, then it must be possible to reidentify God from experience to experience. I examine both a "conceptual" and an "epistemological" argument against these possibilities that is derived from the work of Richard Gale. (...) I argue that neither of these arguments is successful. For God to be a perceptual particular, he must have an inner life; for God to be reidentified across experiences, he need not exist in dimensions analogous to the spatiotemporal. (shrink)

We study the effect of transaction costs (e.g., a trading fee or a transaction tax, like the Tobin tax) on the aggregation of private information in financial markets. We analyze a financial market à la Glosten and Milgrom, in which informed and uninformed traders trade in sequence with a market maker. Traders have to pay a cost in order to trade. We show that, eventually, all informed traders decide not to trade, independently of their private information, i.e., an informational cascade (...) occurs. We replicated our financial market in the laboratory. We found that, in the experiment, informational cascades occur when the theory suggests they should. Nevertheless, the ability of the price to aggregate private information is not significantly affected. (JEL C92, D8, G14). (shrink)

Background: Surveillance technology such as tag and tracking systems and video surveillance could increase the freedom of movement and consequently autonomy of clients in long-term residential care settings, but is also perceived as an intrusion on autonomy including privacy. Objective: To explore how clients in residential care experience surveillance technology in order to assess how surveillance technology might influence autonomy. Setting: Two long-term residential care facilities: a nursing home for people with dementia and a care facility for people with (...) intellectual disabilities. Methods: Ethnographic field study. Ethical considerations: The boards representing clients and relatives/proxies of the clients were informed of the study and gave their written consent. The clients’ assent was sought through a special information leaflet. At any time clients and/or proxy were given the option to withdraw from the study. The research protocol was also reviewed by a medical ethics committee. Findings: Our findings show a pattern of two themes: (1) coping with new spaces which entailed clients: wandering around, getting lost, being triggered, and retreating to new spaces and (2) resisting the surveillance technology measure because clients feel stigmatized, missed the company, and do not like being “watched.” Conclusion: Client experiences of surveillance technology appear to entail a certain ambivalence. This is in part due to the variety in surveillance technology devices, with each device bringing its own connotations and experiences. But it also lies in the devices’ presupposition of an ideal user, which is at odds with the actual user who is inherently vulnerable. Surveillance technology can contribute to the autonomy of clients in long-term care, but only if it is set in a truly person-centered approach. (shrink)

Industrial drug design methodology has undergone remarkable changes in the recent history. Up to the 1970s, the screening of large numbers of randomly selected substances in biological test system was often a crucial step in the development of novel drugs. From the early 1980s, such ‘blind’ screening was increasingly rejected by many pharmaceutical researchers and gave way to ‘rational drug design’, a method that grounds the design of new drugs on a detailed mechanistic understanding of the drug action. Surprisingly, however, (...) the chance-based method of random screening returned to center stage of industrial drug development in the 1990s in the form of ‘high-throughput screening’ (HTS). I will argue in this paper that this to-and-fro in the prominence of random screening comes with fundamental changes in the epistemic significance of chance experiments in pharmaceutical development. While up to the 1970s, random screening used to be chosen as an empirical search strategy primarily because suffi- cient knowledge of the mechanistic basis of drug action was lacking, it has turned with high-throughput screening into an experimental method that employs chance variation and testing to illuminate this mechanistic basis. As a consequence, research into the underlying mechanisms of drug action and the development of new drugs have become closely integrated. The rise of HTS therefore not only shows how chance experiments have assumed a new epistemic role in drug development. It also allows for a detailed study of the much debated emergence of a new relationship between scientific understanding and the development of technological artifacts. (shrink)

I discuss two puzzling and neglected passages in the Critique of Practical Reason, namely, V:92 and V:163. In these passages Kant claims that practical philosophers should follow the paradigm of the chemist and conduct experiments on common human reason. I explain Kant’s conception of the chemical experiment, provide a detailed interpretation of the two passages in question, and conclude by applying the structure of the chemical experiment to the Analytic of the Critique of Practical Reason. Chemical experiments as a model (...) of ethics should be understood as a method of confirming that a philosophical theory systematizes and defends ideas that ordinary rational agents are already committed to. (shrink)

Blindsight, the ability to blindly discriminate wavelength and other aspects of stimuli in a blind field, sometimes occurs in people with lesions to striate (V1) cortex. There is currently no consensus on whether qualitative color information of the sort that is normally computed by double opponent cells in striate cortex is indeed computed in blindsight but doesn’t reach awareness, perhaps owing to abnormal neuron responsiveness in striate or extra-striate cortical areas, or is not computed at all. The existence of primesight, (...) the experience of colored afterimages in blindsight, has been taken to suggest that qualitative color information is computed either in pre-striate or striate cortical areas but is not broadcast to working memory. I argue here that a recent study in which color phosphenes were induced in a blindsighter using bilateral transcranial magnetic stimulation indicates that computations necessary for conscious color vision are lost in blindsight. Owing to this loss, the neural responsiveness in extrastriate cortical areas is abnormal and hence is unable to give rise to color awareness. Blindsight is thus degraded vision in which the computations necessary for conscious color vision have been lost. (shrink)

This paper responds to the four critiques of my book Experiments in Ethics published in this issue. The main theme I take up is how we should understand the relation between psychology and philosophy. Young and Saxe believe that “bottom line” evaluative judgments don’t depend on facts. I argue for a different view, according to which our evaluative and non-evaluative judgments must cohere in a way that makes it rational, sometimes, to abandon even what looks like a basic evaluative judgment (...) because we have changed our minds about the facts. This leads me to qualify Tiberius’s claim that our moral judgments always derive, in part, from fundamental evaluative “justificatory stopping points,” arguing that even these can themselves be adjusted in the light of scientific understanding. Weinberg and Wang object to my use of Kant’s distinction between the perspective of the senses and the perspective of the understanding, because they identify it with a distinction between scientific and philosophical worlds. I argue that a distinction of perspectives isn’t a distinction between worlds and that, in any case, the distinction is not between science and ethics. Finally, in responding to Machery’s objections to a couple of my proposals, I return to the suggestion that a coherentist epistemology is required to deal with the relations between science and ethics. (shrink)

In response to the growing needs of proficient English speakers, the Taiwan Ministry of Education officially included English in standard elementary school curriculum since 2001. English courses at elementary level were extended from the fifth grade to the third grade since the fall of 2005. It is significant to examine whether the educational reform has positively affected students? learning attitudes. Through focus group interviews and questionnaire survey at six elementary schools, this study explores students? attitudes towards learning English and ways (...) of instruction. Results indicate that students generally have strong interests in English?speaking people and desire to spend time in English?speaking places. A majority of students enjoy learning English through games, and compliments from teachers or parents boost their learning motivation. The finding also reveals that English education in Taiwan seems to have directed students towards a narrow viewpoint of foreign cultures since many students associate foreigners with English?speaking people only. Finally, many students experience learning English at cram schools, which indicates the important role cram schools play in students? extracurricular learning. (shrink)

The aim of this paper is to analyze the relationship between phenomenal experience and our folk conceptualization of it. I will focus on the phenomenal concept strategy as an answer to Mary's puzzle. In the first part I present Mary's argument and the phenomenal concept strategy. In the second part I explain the requirements phenomenal concepts should satisfy in order to solve Mary's puzzle. In the third part I present various accounts of what a phenomenal concept is, and I (...) show the difficulties each of them have. Finally, I develop my own account of phenomenal concepts. My thesis claims that phenomenal concepts are complex concepts whose possession conditions depend upon the mastery of many other concepts, in fact, quite complex concepts such as the distinction between appearance and reality (which belongs to our theory of mind system), and color concepts (at least in the case of the phenomenal concepts needed in order to account for Mary's case). And these later concepts are concepts that have special possession conditions: they include the deployment of nonconceptual recognitional capacities. (shrink)

Mark Pennington argues political systems should be decentralized in order to facilitate experimental learning about distributive justice. Pointing out the problems with Pennington's Hayekian formulation, I reframe his argument as an extension of the Millian idea of 'experiments in living.' However, the experimental case for decentralization is limited in several ways. Even if decentralization improves our knowledge about justice, it impedes the actual implementation of all conceptions of justice other than libertarianism. I conclude by arguing for the compatibility of egalitarian (...) redistribution with the epistemic virtues of markets pointed out by Hayek. (shrink)

Few studies have examined how trait emotion dysregulation relates to momentary affective experiences and the emotion regulation strategies people use in daily life. In the current study, 112 c...

In the context of a largely exploratory inquiry, I warn against oversimplifying the relationships among intuitions, emotions, principle-governed reasoning, and responsiveness to reasons. I point out that one cannot determine the normative status of some fact without determining whether a case can be made for this status. But I also note that, though reason is thus autonomous, every episode of reasoning depends causally on the way things nonnormatively are, and this makes it possible for any reasoner to challenge even her (...) most basic normative assumptions. (shrink)

. What are thought experiments, and how do they generate knowledge? More specifically, what sorts of intentional acts must one perform in order to carry out a thought experiment, what sorts of objects are such acts directed toward, and how are those objects made present in such acts? I argue on phenomenological grounds that the proper objects of thought experiments are, in certain cases, uninstantiated universals and relations among them. I will also argue that, in the best of cases, we (...) intuit or “see” these universals and their relations to one another, and respond to some objections to this view. (shrink)

In this study, we present data on graduate students' actual experiences in dealing with impaired peers and faculty predictions of how students would deal with such situations. A total of 29 faculty and 73 graduate students responded to a survey of 40 randomly selected clinical psychology training programs. Student respondents were almost universally (95%) aware of peers whom they regarded as impaired in their professional functioning, and half (49%) the sample reported being aware of a peer's ethical impropriety. Faculty overestimated (...) the number of students who said they "did nothing" when confronted with the resulting ethical dilemma and underestimated the degree of conflict and turmoil (i.e., anger, frustration, dismay) that students reported experiencing. Faculty also estimated that students would be more concerned with peer loyalty issues, whereas students indicated that they were strongly motivated by ethical considerations. Ethics curricula ought more thoroughly to address affective concerns through experiential learning vehicles such as faculty modeling, simulation exercises, and small-group discussion. (shrink)

Aim: To assess ethical issues in everyday clinical practice among physicians and nurses of the University Hospital Rijeka, Rijeka, Croatia.Subjects and methods: We surveyed the entire population of internal medicine, oncology and intensive care specialists and associated nurses employed at the University Hospital Rijeka, Rijeka, Croatia . An anonymous questionnaire was used to explore the type and frequency of ethical dilemmas, rank of their difficulty, access to and use of ethics support services, training in ethics and confidence about knowledge in (...) ethics. Physicians ranged in age from 27 to 61 years, and nurses , from 20 to 52.Results: The most frequent ethical dilemmas concerned uncertain or impaired decision-making capacity , limitation of treatment at the end of life and disagreements among family members . The most difficult dilemmas concerned euthanasia and physician-assisted suicide and limitation of treatment at the end of life . Only a minority reported ever using any kind of ethics support services or being very confident about knowledge in ethics .Conclusions: Similar ethical difficulties are present in the clinical practice of both physicians and nurses, with important differences in access and use of ethics support services. A need for systematic ethics educational activities was identified. Inclusion of individual ethics consultants in Croatian healthcare ethics support services is strongly advised. (shrink)

Volume 16 of Progress in Self Psychology, _How Responsive Should We Be_, illuminates the continuing tension between Kohut's emphasis on the patient's subjective experience and the post-Kohutian intersubjectivists' concern with the therapist's own subjectivity by focusing on issues of therapeutic posture and degree of therapist activity. Teicholz provides an integrative context for examining this tension by discussing affect as the common denominator underlying the analyst's empathy, subjectivity, and authenticity. Responses to the tension encompass the stance of intersubjective contextualism, advocacy (...) of "active responsiveness," and emphasis on the thorough-going bidirectionality of the analytic endeavor. Balancing these perspectives are a reprise on Kohut's concept of prolonged empathic immersion and a recasting of the issue of closeness and distance in the analytic relationship in terms of analysis of "the tie to the negative selfobject." Additional clinical contributions examine severe bulimia and suicidal rage as attempts at self-state regulation and address the self-reparative functions that inhere in the act of dreaming. Like previous volumes in the series, volume 16 demonstrates the applicability of self psychology to nonanalytic treatment modalities and clinical populations. Here, self psychology is brought to bear on psychotherapy with placed children, on work with adults with nonverbal learning disabilities, and on brief therapy. Rector's examination of twinship and religious experience, Hagman's elucidation of the creative process, and Siegel and Topel's experiment with supervision via the internet exemplify the ever-expanding explanatory range of self-psychological insights. (shrink)

Psychedelics have shown promise as a treatment for depression. Although there is some debate, a popular view is that psychedelics produce their benefits in an experience-dependent manner. This is the view that a depressed person gets better, inter alia, because of the experience she has had on psychedelics. Among the various questions that treatment for depression with psychedelics raise, one of the most important is: By what mechanism do these drugs reduce symptoms? If the experience-dependent view is (...) correct, the answer, at least on the personal level of explanation, lies in the phenomenology. In this paper, borrowing mainly from Ratcliffe’s account of depression, I offer such an answer. I argue that psychedelic experiences involve a surge of existential feelings, which can revise the depressed person’s diminished sense of possibility and restore their ability to be affected by the world. I explain how this occurs via a change in the sense of reality linked to the subjective effects of psychedelics. This, I suggest, is the personal level mechanism or process behind psychedelic-assisted psychotherapy for depression. (shrink)

I take it for granted that sense experiential states provide reasons for empirical beliefs; indeed this claim forms the first premise of my central argument for (CC). 1 The subsequent stages of the argument are intended to establish that a person has such a reason for believing something about the way things are in the world around him only if he is in some mental state or other with a conceptual content: a conceptual state. Thus, given that sense experiential states (...) do provide reasons for empirical beliefs, they must have conceptual content. (shrink)

The recently manifested public interest in the ideas of liberalism is quite understandable: the liberal model of the country's development is totally in consonance with the situation our society is currently experiencing. The experience of social change accumulated over the past few years confirms the permanent value of many of the principles of liberalism for overcoming the profound crisis being experienced by Russia.

Can the phenomenal character of perceptual experience be altered by the states of one's cognitive system, for example, one's thoughts or beliefs? If one thinks that this can happen then one thinks that there can be cognitive penetration of perceptual experience; otherwise, one thinks that perceptual experience is cognitively impenetrable. I claim that there is one alleged case of cognitive penetration that cannot be explained away by the standard strategies one can typically use to explain away alleged (...) cases. The case is one in which it seems subjects' beliefs about the typical colour of objects affects their colour experience. I propose a two-step mechanism of indirect cognitive penetration that explains how cognitive penetration may occur. I show that there is independent evidence that each step in this process can occur. I suspect that people who are opposed to the idea that perceptual experience is cognitively penetrable will be less opposed to the idea when they come to consider this indirect mechanism and that those who are generally sympathetic to the idea of cognitive penetrability will welcome the elucidation of this plausible mechanism. (shrink)

There is empirical evidence suggesting a positive link between direct experiences in nature and people’s environmental attitudes (EA) and behaviors (EB). This has led researchers to encourage more frequent contact with nature, especially during childhood, as a way of increasing pro-environmentalism (i.e., pro-EA and pro-EB). However, the association between experiences in nature and EA/EB is complex, and specific guidelines for people’s everyday contact with nature cannot be provided. This article offers an overview of the research conducted until know about the (...) relation between experiences in nature and pro-environmentalism, and opens up new inquiries for future research. We begin with an introduction to people’s current tendency toward an alienation from the natural world and set out the objectives of the article. It is followed by three main sections. The first one reports on what experiences in nature refer to, how and where they occur. The second section describes the different approaches used to investigate and interpret the experiences in nature-EA and EB relation. The last section provides suggestions for future research. We close by making some final remarks about the importance of (re)stablishing a greater interaction with nature for people’s pro-EA and EB. (shrink)

During recovery from psychosis (diagnosed as schizophrenia) things must often be done slower than normally expected. The tempo of the socially shared reality is often experienced as being too fast for the recovering person. We will describe how this impairment stems from the pre-reflective mental structure underlying psychosis and how it can be transferred into an active skill supporting recovery, often including social retreat. In this paper, co-written by a psychiatrist and a person experienced in psychosis (= participatory health research), (...) we will draw on personal experiences, (participatory) qualitative research and first-hand accounts for our arguments. We will sketch out the process and three crucial building blocks of recovery: laid-back situations, switch-off skills, places to talk. We will then describe the acquired skill of slowing-down as an amalgam of the building blocks ‘switch-off skill’ and ‘laid-back situation’, since slowing-down answers the situation in a laid-back manner and enforces a slow behavioral pace on it. While this might be okay in private and in some situations shared with others (i.e. during serene situations), it may be tantalizing for others in many everyday situations resulting in stigma or exclusion (i.e. during work). Slowing-down therefore challenges the surrounding others and demonstrates the necessity to synchronize private and public tempos. This is most challenging while living in two realities at once, being the second and often a long-lasting stage of recovery (stage of double realities). (shrink)

Questionnaires on perceptual distortions, symptoms of schizophrenia, and out-of-body experiences (OBEs) were completed by 71 volunteers with a history of schizophrenia and 40 control subjects (patients in a hospital accident ward). Significantly more of the schizophrenics (42%) than of the control group (13%) answered "yes" to a question about OBEs. However, a follow-up questionnaire showed that only 14% of schizophrenics (i.e., the same as the control group) had had "typical" OBEs, in which a change of viewpoint was reported. Those reporting (...) typical OBEs did not report more perceptual distortions or symptoms of schizophrenia than did those reporting no OBEs, although those reporting other atypical experiences did. On this basis there is no evidence to consider the typical OBE as pathological or as symptomatic of schizophrenia. (shrink)

This essay explores the unique temporal experience in anxiety. Drawing on first-person accounts as well as examples from literature, I attempt to show how anxiety not only disrupts our physiological and cognitive timing but also disturbs the embodied rhythms of everyday social life. The primary goal, however, is to articulate the extent to which human existence itself is a temporally structured event and to identity the ways that anxiety disrupts this structure. Using Martin Heidegger’s account of human existence as (...) a point of departure, I show how the mood of anxiety has the power to alter our self-interpretations by closing down or constricting our experience of the future. I argue that a constricted future impedes our ability ‘to be’ because it closes off the range of projective meanings that we would ordinarily draw on to create or fashion our identities. (shrink)

What reactions are legitimate when someone is pursuing an experiment in living that has, in your considered view, gone awry? This essay discusses how the way Mill expressed his concern over the cultivation of individuality places some stress on the harm principle and on the permissibility of making the sort of judgments about another person that seem fairly natural to make when someone is pursuing an experiment in living that has gone considerably awry. It is surprisingly difficult, but I argue (...) not impossible, to provide a representation of Mill’s view about such cases in a way that accommodates everything that Mill seems to commit himself to: the harm principle; antipathy towards conformism; and the permissibility of making some very negative appraisals of certain modes of living. (shrink)